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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING
CENTER, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No,

14568

PUBLIC-SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and FRANK S. WARNER
and OLOF E. ZUNDEL, Commissioners, and UTAH POWER AND
LIGHT COMPANY,
Defendants.
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
The defendant, Public Service Commission of Utah, rested
its whole argument on the question of Res Judicata and that is
the principal basis of the arguments of defendant Utah Power
and Light Company.

The latter defendant also contends the Com-

mission correctly determined the plaintiff was not exempt from
regulation.

We address ourselves first to the matter of Res

Judicata.
Point I
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY IN THE COTTONWOOD
xMALL CASE BECAUSE:
1.

THE FACTS, THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE
IDENTITY IN THE QUALITY OF PERSONS INVOLVED HAVE
CHANGED.

-22.

THE BURDEN IS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING RES JUDICATA
TO ESTABLISH BY AFFIRMATIVE PROOF, THAT THE CAUSE
OF ACTION INVOLVED AND THE PARTIES ARE IDENTICAL IN
THIS CASE.

3.

UNDER THE ERIE CASE THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE
HOW UTAH LAW APPLIES IN UTAH.

4.

IF RES ADJUDICATA IS TO APPLY, A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE
BOUND BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM.

5.

THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL
COURT RULED IN THE COTTONWOOD MALL CASE.

1.

MOST JURISDICTIONS INDICATED THAT IN ORDER TO APPLY THE RES
JUDICATE DOCTRINE, THERE MUST BE FOUR ELEMENTS PRESENT:
a.

Identity of subject matter,

b.

Identity of cause of action,

c.

Identity of persons and parties,

d.

Identity in the quality of persons for or against whom
the claim is made.
Cooper v Warnock, Wash., 134 P 2 706, 709
Smith v Gray, Nevada, 250 P 369
Pompanio v Larsen, Colorado, 251 P. 534
Paroutsis v Gregory, Penn., 35 A 2 559
Res Judicata can apply only when the issues are identical.
Emerson Estate v Cook, 111., 50 NE 2 772
McCormick v Hartman, Mich., 10 NW 2 910
Klassen v Central Kansas Corp., Kans., 165 P 2 601, 606
Res Judicata is not available where the issue in an actior

differs in any way from the issue in our earlier action betwe«

-3the same parties.
Cartey v Klein, New York, 24 NYS2 67 68
When it appears an issue was not determined by judgment,
it is not Res judicata.
Stark v Coher, Calif., 129 P 2 290, 393
Panos v Great Western, Calif., 126 P 2 889, 895
In the case of West Jordon, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P 2d 105,
1958, certain land owners obtained a judgment for severance from
the town by a District Court decree.

About two weeks later the

town passed an ordinance annexing the lands theretofore severed.
The landowner brought another action and the Honorable A. H. Ellett
dismissed the suit on grounds of Res Judicata.

The Supreme Court

reversed the lower court on the theory that the cause of action had
changed.
"Since the lands did not again become part of the
territory of the town until two weeks after the
severance in the prior action, their petition did
not involve the same cause of action even though
part of the subject matter was the same and the
same reasons were given for desiring the serverance."
"Since this action is based on a new and different
ordinance which necessarily requires the determination of essentially different facts from those
determined in the previous action that doctrine
can have no application to this case."
Obviously this case shows how liberal the Utah Courts are
on the matter of Res Judicata.

The Cottonwood Mall case has a

much stronger basis to show a change of facts and cause of action. In
the Cottonwood Mall case the facts have changed, the identity of the
subject matter has changed and the identity of the quality of person has changed.

One of the principal pegs on which the Federal

Court hung its hat was the fact that Eldredge Furniture Company

-4had purchased its store area and owned that one section of the
Cottonwood Mall.

The fact is that now, and at the time appli-

cation was made to the Public Service Commission, Eldredge
Furniture had sold its space back to the Mall so the plaintiff
owned all of the Cottonwood Mall property.
have changed.

Obviously the facts

The identity of the subject matter has changed

in that plaintiff now owns all the property.

The identity of

the quality of person has changed in that the Federal Court
found the Mall would be a utility and now it would not be a
utility.

We do not concede that the Federal Court made a

correct decision even in view of the Eldredge ownership, but
certainly this change is a material change sufficient to take
the case outside of the bounds of Red Judicata and is sufficient
to open the matter for a decision of this court on its merits
or for a reversal to send back to the Public Service Commission to rule the plaintiff is exempt.
In the case of East Mill Creek Water Co. v Salt Lake City
Utah 1945, 159 P2d 863, the court held:
"Where claim, demand or cause of action is different
in the two cases, then judgment in the €>arlier cases
is res judicata of the later only to extent that the
earlier judgment actually raised and decided the same
points and issues which are raised in the later case."
This case followed numberous other Utah cases as follows
Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56, 57 P. 716. Glen Allen
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362,
296 P. 231; Leone v. Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. 2d
699; Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah
340, 16 P. 2d 1097, on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44
P. 2d 698; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365 at page
422, 120 P 2d 285 at page 315.

-546 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §44 3 states:
"Clearly, the enforcement of the rule of res Judicata may not be avoided by the discovery of new
evidence bearing on a fact or issue invovled in
the original action, as distinguished from a subsequent fact or event which creates a new legal
situation, even though the newly discovered evidence might have been sufficient to justify a new
trial in the first case. However, where, after
the rendition of a judgment, subsequent events
occur, creating a new legal situation or altering
the legal rights or relations of the litigants,
the judgment may thereby be precluded from operating
as an estoppel. In such case, the earlier adjudication is not permitted to bar a new action to
vindicate rights subsequently acquired, even if the
same property is the subject matter of both actions."

The many footnote cases include California, Idaho and
Washington cases.
§443 goes on to say:
"In this connection, it has been declared that the
doctrine of res judicata extends only to facts and
conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered, and that a judgment is not res
judicata as to rights which were not in existence
at the time of the rendition of the judgment. It
has even been held that the effect of a judgment
as res judicata may be preduced by events creating
a new legal situation occurring pendente lite before
the rendition of the judgment, where a supplemental
pleading is not filed."
§382 discussing merger of cause of action in Judgment
states:
"However, the doctrine of merger of a cause of action
in the judgment rendered thereon is calculated to promote justice, and will be applied with due consideration of the demands of justice and equity; it may be
carried no further than the ends of justice require."
Adam v Davies, Utah, 156 P2207

158 ALR 852*§383

tells us that this doctrine and the doctrine of Res Judicata
may be regarded as identical.

-6Restatement Judgments §54 states that where a judgment
is rendered for the defendant on the ground of the nonexistence
of some fact essential to the plaintiff's cause of action, the
plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining an action after
such fact has subsequently come into existence.
Even in the Knight case cited by both defendants, only
part of the facts were considered as affected by Res Judicata,
not the whole case.
In asserting that no facts were presented in evidence
at the argument before the Public Service Commission the defendants are admitting that they did not present any evidence
to show that the facts in this case are the same as the facts
in the case before the Federal Court.

The burden is clearly

on the moving party to prove circumstances are the same.
Parties asserting Res Judicata must establish, by
affirmative proof, that the cause of action invQlved
and parties are identical as in this case.
McCann
v Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. 1 NW 2 682, 688
2.

NEITHER THE UTAH COURTS NOR OTHER COURTS HAVE STRICTLY
FOLLOWED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA.

JUSTICE AND PUB-

LIC POLICY ARE THE CONTROLLING CONSIDERATIONS.
In the recentAcase of Tates, Inc v Little America,535
P 2 1228

and

5S% P 2 /j£ 5*7 , this court first reversed the lower

courts judgment for defendant in favor of the plaintiff and
remanded the case back to the lower court.

The lower court

granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and religated
the same issues over the objections of the plaintiff.

On the

second appeal, this court upheld the lower court despite the
principle of Res Judicata.

-746 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §402 states:
"The doctrine of res judicata may be said to adhere
in legal systems as the rule of justice. Hence, the
position has been taken that the doctrine of res
judicata is to be applied in particular situations
as fairness and justice require, and that it is not
to be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of
justice or so as to work as injustice.
The sound policy behind the doctrine is also to be
considered in applying the doctrine. . . Moreover,
there are exceptions to the doctrine as res judicata
based upon other important reasons of policy. In
this respect it has been declared that res judicata,
as the embodiment of a public policy, must at times
be weighed against competing interests, and must,
on occasion, yield to other policies. The determination of the question concerning judicial reconsideration is said to require a compromise, in each
case of the two opposing policies, of the desirability and finality and the public interest in reaching the right result.
Underlying all discussion of the problem must be
the principle of fundamental fairness in the due
process sense.
It has accordingly been adjudged
that the public policy underlying the principle of
res judicata must be considered together with the
policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair
adversary proceeding in which to present his case.
It has also been declared that a determination of
issues in an action between private parties cannot
bar a contest to vindicate the public interest."
3.

UNDER THE ERIE CASE, THE STATE COURT SHOULD DECIDE HOW UTAH
LAW APPLIES IN UTAH.
Justice Brandeis in the Erie v Tompkins case, 304 US

64 in overruling the Tysen case states:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied
in any case in the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision is not a matter of federal concern."
and the Justice goes on to say this rule of law is necessary
to preserve, "the autonomy and independence of the states -

-8independence in their legislative and independence in their
judicial departments."

This principle was followed by Justice

Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust Co, v York case, 326 U.S. 99.
The plaintiff contends the Federal Court did not follow
the law in Utah, instead it declared that no law had been made
on the subject.
ject.

We contend that the law was made on the sub-

We contend that the law was made on the subject as set

forth in our main brief pages 10 through 13 both by the courts
and the legislature.

The legislature made it clear that com-

panies like the plaintiff should not be regarded as Utilities
but were exempt where distributuion is through "private property, i.e., property not dedicated to public use, solely
for his own use or use of his tenants. . . ".

The reasoning

of counsel for the defendant is fallacious and unsound when
they argue that the legislation exception does not apply to
Mall because no Malls were in existence in 1917 when the law
was enacted.

That is like saying the U.S. Constitution does

not apply to the jet, rocket, calculator, T.V. and computer age
we are in now because they didn't exist 200 years ago.

That

great constitution still rules our greatly advance civilization
with only a few admendments.

The exception doesnft have to

identify each case specifically wherein it applies; but, obvious
the exception applies to all property "not dedicated to public
use".
THE UTAH COURT IS NOT FORECLOSED FROM NOW ANNOUNCING
THE LAW IN THIS MATTER.

-9In the case of Atkins v Schmutz Manufacturing Co.,
2
372 Fed.

762, decided in 1967, involved a question of

whether a Kentucky one-year statute of limitation or a twoyear Virginia statute of limitation applies to a complaint
filed in a Kentucky Federal Court when the tart occurred in
Virginia.

The Federal Court had previously held in several

cases, following the Kentucky state courts rulings, that the
Virginia two-year statute would apply.

The plaintiff relied

on those federal and state court cases when it filed its complaint in 1963, after the one-year limitation had expired.
The Kentucky court suddenly specifically reversed itself and
"expressly overruled" its previous cases before this case was
concluded which required the Federal Court to reverse its previous decision in order to follow state law.

Obviously the

state court can reserve its position or clarify its position
and the Federal Court must follow the State Courts rulings.
The cases cited by defendant and particularly Ham v.
Holy Rosary Hospital are not in point.

The Ham

case in-

volved constitutional questions that, of course, involved federal law not state law.
4.

IF RES JUDICATA IS TO APPLY A PERSON SHOULD NOT BE BOUND
BY A JUDGMENT UNLESS HE HAS HAD ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO
LITIGATE MATTERS ADJUDICATED AGAINST HIM.
In the Federal Court the plaintiff did not have his

day in court and never had an opportunity to present evidence
since the Federal Court on a motion to dismiss converted it to
a Motion for Summary Judgment and ruled against the plaintiff.

-10Again before the Public Service Commission the defendant,
Utah Power & Light, moved for dismissal and it was granted
without taking any evidence or giving the plaintiff a chance
to be heard.

The case of Davis v. First National Bank of

Waco (Texas), 161 SW2 467, holds that under Res Judicata a
person should not be bound by a judgment unless he has had
an adequate opportunity to litigate matters adjudicated against
him.

In the North Dakota case, Knutson v Ekren, 5 NW2 74, the

court held the issues must be fully tried and litigated.
5.

THE LAW OF THE LAND HAS CHANGED SINCE THE FEDERAL COURT
RULING.
The Judge Ritter decree in the Cottonwood Mall case

was dated July 11, 1969, holding the shopping center would
not be a public utility.

The Lloyd v Tanner case cited and

quoted extensively in our original brief was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in June, 1972, reversing the lower
court and holding that the center was private property and
holding that the shopping center had not dedicated any part
of its property to public use even though roads through it
were public and even though it held the same kind of non business functions that the Cottonwood Mall held.

This ruling in

effect overruled the former law of the land laid out in the
Logan valley decision.
We call to the courts attention a new U.S. Supreme Court
case, Scott Hudgens v National Labor Relations Board, 47 L Ed
2d 196, decided March 3, 1976.

This case involved picketing

of a privately owned shopping center.

The shopping center

-11tried to stop the picketing in the center.

The National Labor

Relations Board held against the center even in view of the
Lloyd case and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order.
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeal's judgment
and held in favor of the shopping center using the Lloyd case
as the chief basis of its ruling.

The majority held that the

holding in the Lloyd case "amounted to a total rejection of the
holding and rational in the Logal valley decision".
ing center was private property.

The shopp-

What the Lloyd case and the

Hudgens cases means to the Cottonwood Mall case is that the
mall must be held to be private property and the fact that it
serves customers and the public both paying and non paying,
that its facilities are not converted to public facilities.
And the light and power provided whether to paying customers
or non paying customers, whether during regular business hours
or on off hours, the power is for its own use or its tenants use.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgment §444
"It is particularly with respect to the doctrine
of collateral estoppel precluding the religation
of an issue adjudicated in the previous action on
a difference cause of action, that a change in the
law after the rendition of the judgment operates
to deny conclusiveness to the judgment.
The rules that a judgment may be denied a conclusive effect because there has been a change in
the law since its rendition has also been regarded
as applicable to a change in the law by intermediate judicial decision of either a state or a
federal court."
Point II
THE COTTONWOOD MALL ELECTRICAL PLANT IS EXEMPT FROM
REGULATION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION.

-12We have already presented argument on this matter in
our prior brief so we present only a few cases to further
rebut the defendant's allegations.
In the 1968 Massachusetts case, Re Frank Properties,
Inc. 72 PUR 3d 305, where applicant applied for an advisory
ruling on the question of whether a shopping center landlord
proposing to furnish tenants "total energy service" would be
subject to regulation.

After a well considered opinion, a

copy of which is attached, the Public Utilities Department
ruled that the landlord would not be a public utility.
ruling has stood in effect thereafter.

The

The case is signifi-

cant because the analyzed leading court cases dealing with
"total energy" from Pennsylvania (Drexellrook Associates v
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 1965, 212 A 2d 237),
from Wisconsin (Re City of Sun Prairie, 1965, 57 PUR 3d 525
and General Split Corp., 1962, 44 PUR 3d 334), from New Jersey
(Freehold Water & Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home Park, 1967,
68 PUR 3d 523).
In the case Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company
where the Ohio Shopping Centers Asso. Intervened, 53 PUR 3d
234, 1964, held that the Ohio Public Utilities Commission had
no jurisdiction over sales of electrical energy by the Shopping
Center and that the Shopping Center was not a public utility.
In Llano, Inc v Southern Union Gas Co., N.M. 1964, 399
P 2d 646, the court considered the case where Llano purchased
natural gas for delivery and resale to one industrial customer.
They quote from 73 CJS Public Utilities §2 and from 4 3 Am Jur
571 Public Utilities and then

states:

-13"Applying these rules to the facts in the instant
case we think the conclusion is inescapable that
Llano at no time held itself out as engaged in
supplying natural gas "to or for the public," or
to any limited portion of the public which might
require natural gas, to the extent of Llano's
capacity. It is now legally committed to serve
but one private industry, and has held itself
out as willing to serve only such other private
industrial users as its selects, if and when
additional natural gas reserves are available
to it. Nor do we find any evidence, in support
of the Commission's finding and/or conclusion,
that Llano has held and is holding itself as
ready, willing and able to provide natural gas
service to or for the public or any segment thereof."
We also attach a copy of the City of San Prairie case
(1967) and the Drexellrook case (1965).

Both of these cases in-

volved landlords of big apartment complexes.

The Public Util-

ities laws of each state are about the same as that in the state
of Utah "providing gas or electrity to or for the public".
The principal of Res Judicata does not apply in the
Cottonwood Mall case and clearly the mall operation is exempt
from regulation by the commission.
Wherefore, we pray the Honorable Court reverse the ruling of the Public Service Commission finding the Cottonwood Mall
is exempt from regulation by the commission.
Respectfully submitted,

y
/Keith E. Sohm

-14Copies of the foregoing Reply were served upon defendants by mailing first class to attorneys for defendants, Robert Gordon, P. 0. Box 899 Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, and to
G. Blaine Davis, 236 State Capitol Building., Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84114, dated this 3rd day of November, 1967.
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Keith E. Sohm

Appendix

A

RE FRANK PROPERTIES, INC.
MASSACHUSETTS

DEPARTMENT

OF PUBLIC

UTILITIES

Re Frank Properties, Inc
D.P.U. 15715
January 29, 1968
PPLICATION for advisory riding on question whether shop. ping center landlord proposing to furnish tenants total
energy service would be subject to regtdation; ruling granted,
and proposed operation found not subject to regulation.

A

Public utilities, §11 — Advisory ruling as to utility status — Landlord total energy
service.
1. Upon application for an advisory ruling on the question whether a shopping center landlord which proposes to furnish total energy service to its
tenants would be subject to utility regulation, the department of public
utilities would exercise its discretion to give such a ruling where the landlord proposed to make a substantial investment and where the total energy
concept was receiving wide attention at the time, p. 306.
Public utilities, §23 — Regulation dependent upon sale of service — Statute.
2. A Massachusetts statute which subjects to regulation "all . . . corporations which . . . operate works . . .
for the manufacture and
sale or distribution and sale of gas . . .
or of electricity" makes regulation dependent upon the existence of a sale, unlike statutes in other jurisdictions which make regulation dependent upon the public nature of the activity,
p. 307.
Public utilities, §41 — Landlord "total energy" services to tenants.
3. A shopping center landlord is not a gas or electric company subject to
regulation under a statute subjecting to regulation "all . . . corporations
which . . . operate works . . . for the manufacture and sale or distribution and sale of gas . . .
or of electricity" where the landlord,
using gas either directly or converting it, proposed to provide total energy
service—heating, electric current, domestic hot water, and chilled water for
air conditioning—for which each tenant initially will pay 55 cents per annum
per square foot as an additional component of the rental, and where the
landlord will make meter readings of such service to tenants for two years,
on which to establish charges for the remainder of 10-year leases without
regard to the quantity of energy consumed by the tenants during such
period: the commission found that the arrangement was "rent inclusion,"
p. 308.
By the D E P A R T M E N T : On July 10, with tenants under which it proposes
1967, Frank Properties, Inc., a Del- to supply tenants with various energy
aware corporation engaged in the busi- requirements, commonly known as
ness of owning and operating shopping "tot?I energy" plan, filed a request for
centers, having entered into leases an advisory ruling, pursuant to § 8 of
[20]
305
72 PUR 3d

MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
Chap 30A of the General Laws, "as
to the legality of the proposed plan in
the light of the regulations and statutes administered . . ." by the
department of public utilities, if it conducted activities described herein.
Documents and written representations as to the operations of Frank
Properties, Inc., have been received
by the department. The Massachusetts Electric Company was given an
opportunity to be heard in this matter
and declined this opportunity.
[1] The promulgation of advisory
rulings is discretionary with the department. Since Frank Properties,
Inc., proposes to make a substantial
investment, the advisability of which
may depend in large part on the legal
effect of the proposed operation and
since the total energy concept is one
that is receiving wide attention,1 the
department believes that this is an appropriate matter for an advisory ruling. It must be emphasized that the
ruling relates to the specific facts set
forth in this opinion, and any variation
from these facts in this or any other
case might require a different ruling.
In addition, it is important that the
issue we are ruling on be precisely defined. The request for the ruling states
the issue in terms of "legality" which
is too general. The arrangement
might or might not be legal for a company subject to Chap 164. There is a
threshold question, however; namely,
whether this arrangement would constitute Frank Properties, Inc., a "gas
company" or an "electric company"
under the provisions of §§ 1 and 2 of
Chap 164 of the General Laws. In
this opinion we address ourselves to

that question alone and we note no determination as to the propriety of this
arrangement for a company which is
subject to regulation under Chap 164.
Frank Properties, Inc., has entered
into leases with various tenants for a
shopping center in Worcester, Massachusetts. It will purchase gas from
the Worcester Gas Company and will
use the gas directly, or by converting
it, for all the energy requirements of
the tenants. Under its lease arrangement the landlord will supply heating
and chilling water for air conditioning
and heating, electric current, and domestic hot water. Each tenant will
pay 55 cents per annum, per square
foot as an additional component of
this rental.
Each lease will be for a minimum
period of ten years. During the first
two years meters will be installed to
measure the tenant's consumption of
electricity, heating, cooling, and domestic hot water. The meters will be
read each month and the tenant will
be furnished a copy of the reading. At
the end of two years a new charge for
the services will be fixed, determined
on the basis of the following: (a)
Average cost of filters used, (b) meter
readings based on the unit cost for
electricity at the rate of .0131 cents
per kilowatt-hour, heating .0183 cents
per unit of 10,000 Btu, cooling .0272
cents per unit of 10,000 Btu, domestic
hot water .125 cents per 100 gallons
exclusive of normal water charges.
The amount previously paid by the
tenant during the 2-year period will
be adjusted and the tenant will pay the
new fixed charge during the remainder
of the lease term without regard to the

*See, e.g., address of Ernest W. Gibson,
Chairman, Public Service Board of Vermont,
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quantity of energy he consumes dur- companies to sell the equipment because the consummation of the transing this period.
[2] Our determination is governed action would make the landlord a
by the provisions of §§1 and 2 of "public utility'' for which a separate
Chap 164, which delineate the entities authorization of the commission was
that are subject to regulation by this required. The Pennsylvania supreme
department and have the duties and court reversed. The applicable statute
obligations of public utilities (although defined a "public utility" as one furthat term is not used in the chapter). nishing gas or electricity "to . . .
Section 1 determines which domestic the public/' and, the court held, servcorporations are subject to Chap 164, ice limited to tenants only was not
and is not therefore applicable to service to the "public."
Similarly, in Freehold Water &
Frank Properties, Inc. Section 2,
however, contains substantially iden- Utility Co. v Silver Mobile Home
tical definitions applicable to foreign Park (NJ 1967) 68 PUR3d 523, a
corporations. The difference between mobile home park owner which supthe two sections is that foreign corpo- plied water to its tenants was held not
rations are not subject to certain types to be a public utility under a statute
of regulation, principally control of which defined utility as a company
which supplied water for "public use."
security issues.
Section 2 provides that substantially Among the reasons cited by the comall the other regulatory provisions mission were the absence of metering,
shall apply to "all . . . corpora- the limitation of service to tenants,
tions which . . . operate works and the incidental nature of the opera. . .
for the manufacture and sale tion of the water supply as compared
or distribution and sale of gas . . . to the main business of the trailer
park.
or of electricity . . . ."
The Wisconsin Public Service ComBecause of this special language
defining the jurisdiction of this de- mission dealt with a "total energy"
partment, decisions in other states re- arrangement in Re City of Sun Prairie
lating to similar arrangements between (Wis 1965) 57 PUR3d 525, and held
landlord and tenants are not appropri- that the landlord was not a "public
ate. In Drexelbrook Associates v utility" because the use of energy, bePennsylvania Pub. Utility Commis- ing limited to tenants was not being
sion (1965) 418 Pa 430, 60 PUR3d supplied to the "public," as provided
175, 212 A2d 237, the landlord pro- in the statute. It was pointed out that
posed to acquire certain equipment there would be no submetering though
from the electric and water company apparently no reliance was placed on
serving it. It would then buy gas, this fact. See also General Split Corp.
water, and electricity at certain meter- v P.&V. Atlas Industrial Center, Inc.
ing points and distribute the gas, wa- (Wis 1962) 44 PUR3d 334.
It is the public nature of the activity
ter, and electricity to tenants who
would be separately metered and which controls regulatory jurisdiction
charged by the landlord. The com- in these states. Whether gas or elecmission denied the application of the tricity is being sold is only incidentally
7
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relevant if at all. The cases are therefore not persuasive in construing our
statute which makes no reference to
the "public," but makes regulation
depend on the existence of a "sale."
On the other hand, our decisions
(and those of the supreme judicial
court) relating to ''resale" of electricity, though not directly related to possible regulatory jurisdiction over
landlords, furnish useful clues as to
the meaning of our statute as applied
to total energy arrangements. In Re
Boston Edison Co. (Mass 1953) 98
PUR NS 427, affd sub nom. Boston
Real Estate Board v Massachusetts
Dept. of Pub. Utilities (1956) 334
Mass 477, 15 PUR3d 47, 136 NE2d
243, we held that Boston Edison Company was justified in filing a tariff
under which no power would be sold
within the territory in which it sold
electricity to any person purchasing the
power for resale. By this tariff amendment the company brought an end to
the practice of landlords purchasing
power at wholesale rates and submetering it to their tenants. There
was no occasion to decide whether
such landlords were themselves subject to regulation, but it is clear from
the language that this department and
the supreme judicial court considered
that the practice constituted a "resale."
Compare A. W. Perry, Inc. v Boston
Edison Co. (Mass 1947) 70 PUR NS
161; Re Boston Edison Co. (Mass
1949) D.P.U. 8228.

to regulation under Chap 164. Re
Lowell (Mass 1957) D.P.U. 11694.
This is not such a case, however. The
charge which the landlord proposes to
make covers far more than the use of
electricity or gas. It includes, for example, heating and cooling. Although
the fuel cost may be a component to
his charge to the tenant, it cannot be
separately stated apart from the cost
of equipment and labor necessary to
provide the tenant with heat. The use
of meters described herein does not
make the arrangement a sale of gas or
electricity. At most, only the electricity portion of the charge could be
said to be directly measured. The use
of gas for heating and air conditioning
is only indirectly measured through
the measurement of heat.
The controlling fact is that over the
entire course of the lease the charge
will not be based on measured consumption, even of the electric portion
of the charge. Because the total energy
concept is new, it is difficult to estimate the portion of the rent that the
landlord must charge for heat, hot
water, air conditioning, and electricity.
The metering for the 2-year period
merely provides a basis for estimating
a fair rental of the premises. The situation is not significantly different
from that of an apartment building
landlord who supplies heat and hot
water and electricity to the tenants
without metering. The difference is
that this landlord through the accumulated experience of apartment house
owners is able to estimate with reasonable certainty the cost to him of supplying these services over the long
run. The metering in this case provides for a new arrangement on the
same basis as exists for the long-stand-

[3] If Frank Properties, Inc., proposed to meter the electricity or gas
consumed by each tenant and charge
on the basis of the meter reading, we
would be constrained to hold that this
constituted a "sale" of gas or electricity, subjecting Frank Properties, Inc.,
308
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ing practice with respect to apartment
houses.
Accordingly, we believe that the arrangement described herein is rent inelusion as that term was used in

D.P.U. S862, and we rule that on
these facts the landlord Frank Properties, Inc., would not be a gas company
or an electric company,
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City of Sun Prairie
V

Wisconsin Public Service Commission
Additional respondents: Lewis P. Brooks, Brooks Equipment
Leasing, Inc., and Wisconsin Gas Company
— Wis 2d —, 154 NW2d 360
November 28, 1967
PPEAL

from judgment affirming commission decision that

landlord providing services to tenants was not public
A
utility; affirmed. For commission decision, see (1965) 57
PUR3d 525
Statutes, §11 — Judicial construction.
1. A construction given to a statute by the court becomes a part thereof
unless the legislature subsequently amends the statute to effect a change,
p. 418.
Public utilities, §41 — Services by apartment complex to tenants.
2. A landlord of a large apartment complex furnishing heat, water, light,
and power to all tenants-, but not serving any adjoining landowners or the
public generally, is not a public utility and therefore not subject to commission jurisdiction, p. 418.
Proceeding by plaintiff city of Sun not require a certificate of convenience
Prairie to review a declaratory ruling and necessity.
of the Public Service Commission of
The city of Sun Prairie, which is
Wisconsin that the project of defend- a public utility operating under an inant Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc. determinate permit to furnish electric
(hereinafter "Brooks"), in furnishing heat, light, and power to the public
heat, power, light, and water to its within its boundaries, made applicatenants in its multiple apartment com- Hon to the commission for such deplex does not bring Brooks within the claratory ruling on July 23, 1964.
definition of a "public utility" as de- Brooks was then the owner of a 15fined by § 196.01(1), Statutes. Lewis acre parcel of land in the city of Sun
P. Brooks, its president, was also Prairie on which it proposed to conjoined as a party defendant. Because struct a 240-unit apartment project
Brooks was not a public utility, the housed in 15 buildings that will house
commission determined Brooks was up to 1,000 people. Heat, light, water,
not within its jurisdiction and did and power will be supplied by Brooks
[27]

417
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to all tenants in the project. Natural
gas will be purchased by it to operate
engines which will drive four electrical
generators with a total capacity of
500 kw. Heat-recovery equipment
will utilize waste heat from the engines to furnish low-pressure steam
to heat and air condition all 240
apartment units. No water, electricity, or heat will be supplied to adjoining landowners or to the public
generally. The rents paid by the tenants wiU cover the expense of the
utility services, so that they will not
be separately billed for same. Brooks
will rent an apartment "to any responsible person" who is able to pay
the rent.
After the commission made its
declaratory ruling, the city of Sun
Prairie petitioned the commission for
a rehearing. Upon the denial of such
petition, the city then instituted the
instant review proceeding in circuit
court.
By judgment entered February 13,
1967, the circuit court affirmed the
declaratory ruling of the commission,
and the city has appealed.
The Wisconsin Gas Company,
which sells gas to Brooks for use
in its project, appeared in the proceedings before the commission and in
the review before the circuit court, and
opposed the city's petition.
APPEARANCES : Petersen, Sutherland, Axley & Brynelson, Madison,
Wilmer E. Trodahl, City Attorney,
Sun Prairie, for appellant; Bronson
C. La Follette, Attorney General,
William E. Torkelson and Clarence
B. Sorenson, Madison, for Public
Service Commission; Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser & Hansen, Madison, for
71 PUR 3d
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Lewis P. Brooks and Brooks Equipment Leasing, Inc.; Foley, Sammond
& Lardner, Vernon A. Swanson, and
N. J. Lesselyoung, Milwaukee, for
respondent Wisconsin Gas Company.
CURRIE, Ch.

J.:

[1,2] The issue on this appeal is
whether the landlord of a large complex which furnishes heat, light, water,
and power to its tenants is a public
utility within the definition of § 196.01
(1), Stats, so as to be under the
jurisdiction of the public service commission. This statute defines a public
utility as follows:
" 'Public utility' means and embraces every corporation, company,
individual, . . . town, village, or
city that may own, operate, manage,
or control . . . any part of a plant
or equipment, within the state . . .
for the production, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of heat, light,
water, or power either directly or indirectly to or for the public. . . ."
We deem Cawker v Meyer1 to be
determinative of the result. In that
case the landlord constructed a building in the city of Milwaukee to be
rented for stores, offices, and light
manufacturing purposes, A steam
plant was installed therein to generate
heat, electric light, and power to be
furnished to the tenants and occupants
of the building who desired such utility service. Since the landlord was
unable to dispose of all the heat and
electricity to his tenants, he entered
into contracts with three adjoining
property owners to furnish them heat
and power.
The Wisconsin Railroad Commis*
* (1911) 147 Wis 320. 133 NW 157, 37
LRA NS 510.

SUN PRAIRIE v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
sion, which had jurisdiction over
public utilities at that time, contended
that the landlord was a "public utility" as defined in § 1797m-l, Stats
(now § 196.01(1), Stats). The commission argued that the furnishing of
heat, light, and power "to anyone else
than to one's self is furnishing it to
the public within the meaning of the
statute."* This court stated:
". . . It was not the furnishing
of heat, light, or power to tenants, or,
incidentally, to a few neighbors, that
the legislature sought to regulate, but
the furnishing of those commodities to
the public; that is, to whoever might
require the same. Wisconsin River
Tmprov. Co. v Pier (1908) 137 Wis
325, 118 NW 857, 21 LRA NS 538.
The use to which the plant, equipment,
or some portion thereof is put must
be for the public, in order to constitute it a public utility. But whether
or not the use is for the public does
not necessarily depend upon the number of consumers; for there may be
only one. . . . On the other hand,
a landlord may furnish it to a hundred
tenants, or, incidentally, to a few
neighbors, without coming under the
letter or the intent of the law. In the
instant case, the purpose of the plant
was to serve the tenants of the owners,
a restricted class, standing in a certain contract relation with them, and
not the public. . . .
•
•
•
•
•
•
". . . The tenants of a landlord
are not the public; neither are a few
of his neighbors, or a few isolated
individuals with whom he may choose

to deal, though they are a part of the
public. The word 'public' must be
construed to mean more than a limited class defined by the relation of
landlord and tenant, or by nearness
of location, as neighbors, or more
than a few who, by reason of any
peculiar relation to the owner of the
plant, can be served by him.
". . . [The statute] was not intended to affect the relation of landlord and tenant, or to abridge the
right to contract with a few neighbors
for a strictly incidental purpose,
though relating to a service covered
by it."3
Chapter 499, Laws of 1907, which
provided for the regulation of public
utilities and contained the definition
of "public utility" found in § I797m-1
(now § 196.01(1), Stats) had become
generally known as the Public Utilities Law.4 The commission to which
this regulation had been entrusted was
the then recently created Wisconsin
Railroad Commission. John Barnes
was the first chairman of this regulatory commission. It is noteworthy
that when the Cawker case reached
the court in 1911, Barnes was then
a member of this tribunal and concurred in the decision.
The statutory definition of "public
utility" in § 1797m-l has not been
amended in any relevant portion since
this court's decision in Cawker, and
the same definition may be found today in § 196.01 (1), Stats. This court
has long been committed to the principle that a construction given to a
statute by the court becomes a part
thereof, unless the legislature sub-

*Id, 147 Wis at p. 324. 133 NW at p. 153. * Sec Crow, Legislative Control of Public
3 Id. 147 Wis at pp. 324-32(3, 133 NW at Utilities in Wisconsin (1933) 18 Marquette
p. 158,
LR 80,
)
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sequently amends the statute to effect
a change.5
The courts of California,6 Missouri,7 Ohio,8 and Pennsylvania9 have
similarly held that a landlord who
furnishes utility service to his tenants
is not a public utility within the definition thereof contained in the applicable state law. Appellant has been
unable to cite a single authority to
the contrary.
We consider the Pennsylvania
court's recent decision in Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania
Public Utility Commission10 to be
highly significant in view of appellant's argument that the rule announced in Cawker should not be
extended to a large apartment complex such as the instant one. Drexelbrook Associates is the owner of a
real-estate development known as
Drexelbrook. It is a garden-type
apartment village with 90 buildings
containing 1,223 residential units, 9
retail stores, and a club with a

dining room, swimming pool, skating
rink, and tennis courts. The Pennsylvania supreme court held that the
tenants of a landlord, although many
in number, do not constitute "the
public" within the meaning of Pennsylvania's Public Utility Law, but
constitute rather a defined, privileged,
and limited group. The court held
that the proposed service of electricity
to them thus would be private in
nature.
As in the instant appeal, it was
argued in the Drexelbrook Associates
case that regulation was desirable to
protect the interest of the tenants in
so large an apartment complex. In
disposing of this argument the Pennsylvania court stated:
"The controlling consideration is
not whether regulation is desirable*
but whether appellant [Drexelbrook
Associates] is subject to regulation
under the Public Utility Law/' 11
Judgment affirmed.

5
Moran v Quality Aluminum Casting Co.
(1967) 34 Wis 2d 542, 556, 150 NW2d 137;
Mednis v Industrial Commission (1965) 27
Wis 2d 439, 444, 134 NW2d 416; Hahn v
Walworth County (1961) 14 Wis 2d 147, 154,
109 NW2d 653, 94 ALR2d 618; Meyer v Industrial Commission (1961) 13 Wis 2d 377,
382, 108 NW2d 556: Thomas v Industrial
Commission (1943) 243 Wis 231, 240, 10
NW2d 206, 147 ALR 103; Milwaukee County
v City of Milwaukee (1933) 210 Wis 336,
341. 246 NW 447; Eau Claire National Bank
v Benson (1900) 106 Wis 624, 627, 628, 82
NW 604.

6 Story v Richardson (1921) 186 Cal 162,
198
Pac 1057, 18 ALR 750.
7
Missouri ex rel. and to use of Cirese v
Missouri Pub. Service Commission (1944)
— Mo App —, 54 PUH NS 169, 178 SW2d
788.
8
Jonas v Swetland Co. 119 Ohio St 12,
PUR1928D
825, 162 NE 45.
9
Drexelbrook Associates v Pennsylvania
Pub. Utility Commission (1965) 418 Pa 430,
6010PUR3d 175. 212 A2d 237.
Supra, footnote 9.
« Id. 418 Pa at pp. 441, 442, 60 PUR3d at
p. 181, 212 A2d at p. 242.
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Drexelbrook Associates
V

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
— Pa —, 212 A2d 237
June 30, 1965

from judgment affirming commission decision which
> disapproved proposed sale and transfer of utility facilities
to apartment complex; reversed and remanded with instructions
to grant approval.
PPEAL

A

Public utilities, §41 — Private service — Landlord service to tenants.
1. An apartment complex proposing to render service to its tenants only, and
at a profit, serves a defined, privileged, and limited group, and the proposed
sendee to them is private in nature and not a public utility service since it
would not be furnished "to or for the public," as provided by Public Utility
Law, p . 175.
Consolidation, merger, and sale, §35 — Grounds for approval or disapproval —
Loss of jurisdiction over service.
2. It was error for the commission to disallow the sale and transfer of
utility distribution and metering facilities to an apartment complex on the
ground that the transfer would remove from commission supervision service
presently subject to its jurisdiction, for the commission did not have jurisdiction with respect to public policy in this matter since the service was not
rendered "to or for the public," as provided by the Public Utility Law; the
controlling consideration was not whether regulation was desirable but
whether the transferee of the facilities was subject to regulation under the
law, p. ISO,
(COHEN*, J., with whom EAGEN, J., joins, dissents, p. 182.)

APPEARANCES:

I r v i n g R.

Segal,

Philadelphia, for appellant; Daniel F .
Joella, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before Bell, CJ., and Musmanno,
Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O'Brien, and
Roberts, J J .
ROBERTS,, J . :

[ 1 ] Applications to the public utill

ity commission were filed by the Philadelphia Electric Company and the
Philadelphia Suburban Water Company seeking approval of the transfer
by sale of certain equipment. 1 Commission approval would enable the
applicants to transfer distribution,
service-supply, and metering equip-

T h e approval was sought under § 202(e) by Act of August 24, 1963, PL 1225, §2, 66
of the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, PS § 1122 (Supp 1964).
1937, P L 1053, 66 P S § 1122(e), as amended
60 PUR 3d
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nient to Drexclbrook Associates, a registered limited partnership which owns
and manages a real-estate development
known as "Drexelbrook." Drexclbrook, located in Drexel Hill, Delaware county, is a garden-type apartment village with 90 buildings, containing 1,223 residential units, 9 retail
stores, various public areas, and a club
with a dining room, swimming pool,
skating rink, and tennis courts.
The equipment involved in the proposed transfer was installed originally
by the applicants in the buildings and
stores of the development and is presently used by the applicants to furnish
gas, water, and electric service directly
to Drexelbrook tenants. Upon conclusion of the transfers, water service
would be supplied by the water company directly to Drexelbrook Associates at four metering points, and gas
and electric service would be supplied
by the electric company to Drexelbrook
Associates at a single metering location.2 Drexelbrook Associates would
purchase gas, electricity, and w^ter
from the applicants at the proposed
metering points. In turn, it would assume the obligation and sole responsibility for furnishing and distributing
gas, electricity, and water to its tenants
and for servicing and maintaining the
transferred facilities.
With respect to electricity and gas,
Drexelbrook Associates assumes that
it would qualify for wholesale tariff

rates at such single metering points,3
and proposes to retain the transferred
meters in order to measure each of its
tenant's individual consumption. It
has agreed to bill each tenant on the
basis of such consumption at the same
rate which the tenant would pay if
he received service individually and directly from the electric company, thereby enabling it to make a profit. In
like manner, Drexelbrook Associates
assumes that, with respect to water,
it would also qualify for the applicable
wholesale tariff rates based on single
point water metering service.4 It proposes to continue to furnish water to
apartment tenants on the existing basis
by including the charges for water
services within the rent. Evidently,
remctcring of water at a profit is contemplated only with respect to the
swim club and store tenants.
The commission dismissed the applications without hearing on August 19,
1963. Drexelbrook Associates then
asked the commission to reopen the
matter and to grant it leave to intervene and offer evidence in support of
the applications. The request was
granted but after a subsequent hearing
the commission by a vote of 3-2, dismissed the applications on Tune 8,
1964. Thereafter, Drexelbrook Associates appealed to the superior court6
which divided equally, thereby affirming the commission's order. A majority of the superior court then certified

* Presently, water service is supplied at 106 factor in the present proceeding, we will not
metering points, electric service is supplied at now indulge in a fact-finding process which
1,335 metering locations, and gas service is the commission itself did not see fit to undertake.
supplied at 1,283 existing locations.
3
4
Although the commission itself seems to
See footnote 3, supra.
5
have assumed previously that Drexelbrook
Neither the Philadelphia Electric Company
would qualify for the wholesale rates, it now nor the Philadelphia Suburban Water Comquestions for the first time in its brief before pany, applicants before the commission, took
this court whether Drexelbrook is so quali- an appeal from the commission's determination.
fied. Even assuming the relevance of this
60 PUR 3d
1
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the case to this court for consideration
and decision. 8
In dismissing the applications, the
commission held that upon consummation of the proposed transfers of the
designated service and metering equipment, appellant would become subject
to the provisions of the Public Utility
Law. 7 For that reason, the commission concluded that it would be necessary for appellant to seek commission
authorization to furnish the public
utility services now rendered by the
applicants.
The term "public utility" is defined
in § 2 of the Public Utility Law as
including "persons or corporations
• . . owning or operating in this
commonwealth equipment, or facilities
for: (a) [Pjroducing, generating,
transmitting, distributing, or furnishing natural or artificial gas, electricity,
. . . to or for the public for compensation; (b) [ d i v e r t i n g , developing, pumping, impounding, distributing, or furnishing water to or for the
public for compensation . . . ." 8
(Emphasis supplied.) The question
presented is whether the service which
appellant proposes to furnish to its
tenants would be service to or for the
public within the meaning of the statute.
A number of decisions prove helpful in deciding the question in this
case. In Borough of Ambridge v
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission, 108 Pa Super Ct 298, P U R 1 9 3 3
D 298, 165 Atl 47, allocatur den 108
Pa Super Ct xxiii, where a manufacturer who furnished water to another

c.

manufacturer was held not to be rendering a public service, the court said
that " ' [t] he public or private character
of the enterprise does not depend . . .
upon the number of persons by whom
it is used, but upon whether or not
it is open to the use and service of all
members of the public who may require
it • . . . ' " (Emphasis supplied.)
108 Pa Super Ct at p. 304, P U R 1 9 3 3
D at p 301, 165 Atl at p. 49. Aronimink Transp. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub.
Service Commission (1934) 111 Pa
Super Ct 414, 5 P U R N S 279, 170
Atl 375, was a case where a corporation operated apartment houses and
furnished bus transportation to its tenants. Because the corporation served
only those who were selected as tenants
—a special class of persons not open
to the indefinite public—the court held
the service to be private in nature. 9
The court concluded that the service
rendered was merely incidental to the
business of maintaining the apartment
house, and the fact that the transportation was furnished to hundreds of
individuals residing in the 288 apartments did not transform the private
nature of the service into a "public
service."
Overlook Develop. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission,
101 Pa Super Ct 217, P U R 1 9 3 1 E 68,
affd per curiam (1932) 306 Pa 43,
158 Atl 869, involved a land development company which distributed water
not only to vendees situated on its
previously owned tract of land, but
also to owners of adjacent land. The
court held the service was not open

8 Act of Mav 23, 1937, PL 1053. §2(17)
«See Act of June 24, 1895, PL 212, §10,
(a)9 & (b), 66*PS §1102(17) (a) & (b).
17 PS § 197.
The court cited with approval the quota* Act of May 28, 1937, PL 1053, §§ 1 ct seq.,
tion from Borough of Ambridge, supra, in
as amended, 66 PS §§ 1101 et seq.
text
[12]
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to the indefinite public but, being con- whether anybody among the public
fined to privileged individuals, was pri- outside of the Drexelbrook group is
vate in nature. Significantly, the com- privileged to demand scrvice.,,1° In
mission itself, in Camp Wohclo v the present case the only persons who
Novitiate of St. Isaac Jogues (1958), would be entitled to and who would
36 Pa PUC 377, adhered to the doc- receive service are those who have
trine expressed in Overlook, stating entered into or will enter into a landthat "a public use . . . 'is not con- lord-tenant relationship with appellant.
fined to privileged individuals, but is Here, as in Aronimink, those to be
open to the indefinite public' " and that serviced consist only of a special class
u
'it is this indefinite or unrestricted of persons—those to be selected as
quality that gives it its public char- tenants—and not a class open to the
acter.'" P U R 1 9 3 1 E a t p . 73.)
indefinite public. Such persons clearly
Although the present case involves constitute a defined, privileged, and
the owner of an apartment complex limited group and the proposed service
which proposes to render service to its to them would be private in nature.11
.tenants and to no one else, the comThe commission concedes that a
mission held that the contemplated landlord would not be a public utility
service would not be merely incidental if its charge for utility service is into the operation of Drexelbrook, but cluded, unitemized, in a flat rental.
would be a separate and distinct enter- The commission contends, however,
prise for profit, subject to the Public that appellant's intention to remeter
Utility Law. In part, the commission the service, charge separately for it,
based its conclusion on the fact that and make a profit presents a "different
appellant does not propose to reserve situation" and results in the proposed
the right to select its customers, but service being public in nature.12 Howwould obligate itself under separate ever, it is apparent that whether or
and uniform contracts to furnish serv- not the utility charge is included in a
ice to all tenants, present and future, flat rental or determined through subin its development. The fallacy of metering, it still constitutes compensathis reasoning is shown in the dis- tion to the landlord. We fail to see
senting opinion of the commission how the method of computing the
chairman which stated that the test charge for the utility service is in any
"is not [whether] all tenants . . . sense determinative of or relevant to
are being furnished [service,] but the issue of whether the service is "to
*° (1964) 41 Pa PUC 505, 515.
The record shows many instances where
landlords and owners of large apartments and
•office buildings purchase utility service on a
wholesale basis and furnish such service to
their office and apartment tenants. Included
among these are the Presidential Apartments,
Rittenhouse Claridge, Rittcnhouse Savoy (all
in Philadelphia), and Lynnewood Gardens (in
Montgomery county), the latter containing
1,796
apartment units.
w
I n its brief, the commission says: "Appellant would have this Honorable Court be3 ) PUR 3d
1
11

lieve that there is considerable submetering by
landlords without certificates of public convenience from the commission. . , . Obviously the minority opinion [apparently of
the commission] and appellant confuse those
situations where a landlord receives wholesale
rates and includes the cost of these services
in the rent, with the obviously different situation involved in the instant appeals. Admittedly the Pennsylvania Utility Commission is not
a rent control commission and has asserted no
jurisdiction over rents," (Emphasis in original.)
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or for the public." "[T]he charge to
the tenant based upon the amount
which the particular tenant actually
uses (as proposed in this application)
is far more equitable to the tenant than
imposing a hidden and unidentified
item in the rental charge without any
showing by the landlord of the basis
on which the utility charge is calculated."13
Even the members of the superior
court who voted to uphold the commission's order stated "that the
distinction made by the commission between including the cost of utility service in a fiat rental charge and submetering is a distinction without a
difference and the question in this appeal does not turn on that fact."14
These judges also said with respect
to situations where the charge is included in the rent: "We are not so
naive as to believe that the cost of
utilities are supplied free to the tenants; nor so naive as to believe that
the landlord does not make a profit
under such circumstances.,,15
However, we cannot agree with the
view, expressed by the three affirming
judges of the superior court, that the
present case may be distinguished from

Overlook and Aronimink on the
basis of the sequence of ownership of
the equipment involved. In the view
of those judges, the cases are distinguishable on the theory that apartment owners or landowners initially
owned the equipment in Overlook and
Aronimink, while in the present case
the equipment, from the time of installation to the application for transfer,
has been owned by public utilities subject to commission jurisdiction.
The determination of whether appellant would be serving the public
after the transfers are completed is
unrelated to the identity of the transferor of the designated assets or to the
fact that the equipment previously had
"been dedicated to a public use and
impressed with a public interest."16
The equipment possesses no mystical
qualities or characteristics which render the service for which it is utilized
a public service irrespective of the private or public nature of the services
or the definite (tenants) or indefinite
(public) identification of the persons
served. The determination as to
whether appellant would be engaged
in a public utility service cannot be
predicated upon whether it originally

13
From the dissenting opinion of the commission chairman. 41 Pa PUC at p. 519.
H (1965) 206 Pa Super Ct at 135, 212 A2d
229, 233.
Thus, in this regard, the commission dissenters and both the three affirming and two
of the dissenting judges of the superior court
were in agreement
»206 Pa Super Ct at p. 135, 212 A2d at p.
233.
A significant decision, not discussed by the
majority of the commission in the present case,
is Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission v
Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942) 23. Pa PUC
320. In that decision the commission determined that it would not prohibit the remctering
or resale of current by the owner of an office
building to his tenants. For a further discussion of the case, sec footnote 20, infra.

18 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 136, 212 A2d at p.
234. This concept, taken from rate-making
decisions (e.g., City of Pittsburgh v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission [1949] 165
Pa Super Ct 519, 528, 82 PUR XS 572, 69 A2d
844, 849, allocatur den 165 Pa Super Ct xxv),
is here misapplied when utilized as a consideration in determining whether the service which
appellant seeks to render to its tenants constitutes public service under the Public Utility
Law. Such application, if correct, would, for
all practical purposes, always preclude a transfer of utility equipment to a nomttility because,
once included in the rate structure of a public
utility, that equipment would be immutably
stamped with public use and interest characteristics.
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installed the necessary equipment at
the time of construction, later installed
it itself, or purchased it from a utility
which had originally installed it.17
We hold, therefore, that the proposed service which appellant would
render in the present case would not
constitute it a public utility within the
meaning of § 2 of the Public Utility
Law since such service would not be
furnished "to or for the public.,,
[2] In the alternative, the commission held that the transfers could not
be approved even if appellant would
not be rendering a public utility service
upon consummation of the proposed
transfers because the commission could
not "disregard the public interest and
abandon the public and the consumers

who would become affected by the
approval of the applications, to uncertain but definitely less desirable
prospects.,,1S The members of the
superior court who voted to affirm the
commission agreed with its position,
stating that "the commission, in exercising its administrative discretion, not
only may but should deny the transfer
of patrons out from under regulation,
even where their consent has been obtained, in circumstance? such as this
case presents, in the public interest and
as a matter of public policy."19
In support of this alternative holding, the commission engaged in much
speculation as to possible evils which
would flow from consummation of the
proposed transfer.20
In substance,

17
The dissenting opinion in the superior
court quite aptly stated:
"If the facilities here involved had been originally installed by the landlord under single
metering and wholesale rates granted to the
landlord by the utilities, there would be no
doubt of the validity of the transaction. As the
record in this case shows, such operations exist . .
. in Pennsylvania. The circumstances that the landlord now seeks single
meter and wholesale rates should make no
difference in the result. What is legal in one
case does not thereby become invalid in the
other. The sequence of events should not be
controlling." 206 Pa Super at p. 12S, 212 A2d
at p. 235.
13 41 Pa P U C a t p. 512.
Presumably, the commission acted under §
202 of the Public Utility Law. Act of May
28, 1937, PL 1053, as amended, 66 PS § 1122.
That section requires the commission's approval, evidenced by a certificate of public convenience, prior to the transfer of assets by a
public utility to any person and prior to any
abandonment of any service to patrons. The issuance of such a certificate is based upon the
commission's determination that it is necessary
-or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public. Although
factual and legal questions have been raised
which cast doubt on the applicability of that
portion of § 202 which involves abandonment of
service, the commission has made no specific
findings with respect^ to such questions and
our disposition of this appeal makes it unnecessary for us to express our views respecting them.

19 206 Pa Super Ct at p. 134, 135, 212 A2d
at p. 233.
20
For example, the commission suggested
that, without its supervision, Drexelbrook tenants might eventually be subject to discrimination in rates as compared to other tenants
who are protected by commission jurisdiction;
that the practice of submetering and resale
might adversely affect the revenue return of
the public utility companies involved and cause
increases in rates to the remaining customers
of such utilities; and, in the alternative, that a
change in rate structure increasing wholesale
prices might make the landlord's utility service unprofitable. The commission also voiced
concern over possible inaccuracies in meters.
It is appropriate to recall the words of the
commission in Pennsylvania Pub, Utility Commission v Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942)
23 Pa PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, when it
expressly refused to prohibit remetering by
a landlord:
"[W]e deem it appropriate to state that we
have considered ^ the advisability of a rule
absolutely prohibiting remetering or
resale of
current. The so-called 'practical1 difficulties
envisaged by respondent as resulting from such
a rule do not require detailed comment, but
it may be observed that some predictions could
not reasonably be expected to eventuate and
the fulfillment of others might well produce
compensating benefits. Also, we have no doubt
of our jurisdiction to consider the reasonableness and justness of any tariff rule and the
practice thereunder, and to take appropriate
corrective action if the rule appears unreasonable or its application unjust: Hickey v Phila-
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however, the position of both the commission majority and the affirming'
members of the superior court can be
reduced to the proposition that it is
against public policy to approve the
transfer since it would remove from
commission supervision service now
subject to its jurisdiction. Such reasoning disregards the express formulation of public policy by the legislature
embodied in the statutory definition of
the term "public utility.'' That provision confers jurisdiction on the commission only where the service involved is rendered "to or for the public." The controlling consideration is
not whether regulation is desirable, but
whether appellant is subject to regulation under the Public Utility Law.
Klawansky v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission (1936) 123 Pa Super
Ct 375, 382, 17 PUR NS 401, 187
Atl 248, 251. If the legislature did
not deem it necessary to confer jurisdiction on the commission with respect
to the service proposed by appellant
(as the commission conceded for purposes of its alternative holding), then
the absence of such jurisdiction as a
result of the consummation of the pro-

posed transfer would not and could not
contravene public policy. Furthermore, the possible evils which the
commission envisaged as a result of
the absence of its supervision could
come to fruition irrespective of whether
a landlord originally installs facilities
or later purchases them from a public
utility, or whether the charge for service is on a metered basis or included
in a flat rental without itemization.
It seems obvious that the same projected evils which the commission majority envisaged as possibilities in the
present case may be equally posited
in other instances and cases previously
approved by the commission and the
superior court.21
We hold, therefore, that the commission erred as a matter of law in
holding that Drexelbrook Associates
would become a public utility upon
consummation of the proposed transfers, and that the commission also
erred in alternatively holding that the
allowance of the transfers would contravene public policy if the commission thereby lost its jurisdiction over
the service involved.
The order is reversed. The record

a tenant at a profit to the landlord, the landlord in my opinion becomes a public utility wd
has no ri^ht to extort a profit for such sale."
23 Pa PUC at p. 323, 42 PUR NS at p. 128.
it is significant that, in the face of this dissent, the majority of the commission held otherwise.
21
See Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Commission
v Philadelphia Electric Co. (1942) 23 Pa
PUC 320, 42 PUR NS 126, supra, footnote 20;
Aronimink Transp. Co. v Pennsylvania Pub.
Service Commission (1934) 111 Pa Super Ct
414, 5 PUR NS 279, 170 Atl 375, supra, text
at p. 177; Borough of Ambridge v Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission, 10S Pa Super
Ct 298, PUR1933D 298, 165 Atl 47, supra,
text at p. 177; Overlook Develop. Co. v
Pennsylvania Pub. Service Commission, 101
Pa Super Ct 217, PUR1931E 63, affd per
curiam (1932) 306 Pa 43, 158 Atl S69, supra,
text at p. 177. See also footnote 11, supra.
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delphia Electric Co. (1936) 122 Pa Super Ct
213, 220, 14 PUR NS 349, 184 Ati 553. Aside
from 'practical* considerations and technical
objections to jurisdiction and procedure, our
decision not to require prohibition of rcmetering or resale turns upon our conclusion that
the record does not show such a requirement
to be necessary at this time for public protection; . . . ." 23 Pa PUC at p. 322,
42 PUR NS at p. 127.
This language of the commission is especially notable and meaningful because it was directly at odds with the opinion of a dissenting
member of the commission. The dissenting
commissioner contended that "the prohibition
of resales of electric current involving a profit
to landlords is a requirement that is necessary
for public protection." 23 Pa PUC at p. 324,
42 PUR NS at p. 128. The dissent also stated:
"When the Philadelphia Electric Company
sells to a landlord and the landlord resells to

is remanded and the commission is
directed to approve the applications
and to issue the appropriate certificates.

